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Introduction: Staking Out the Field
The concept of imagination is notoriously ambiguous.1 Thus one must be cautious 
not to use ‘imagination’ as a placeholder for diverse phenomena and processes that 
perhaps have not much more in common than that they are difficult to assign to 
some other, better defined domain, such as perception, conceptual thought, or artistic 
production. However, this challenge also comes with great opportunities: the fecun-
dity and openness of ‘imagination’ appeal to researchers from different disciplines 
with different approaches and questions, and it draws together fields of enquiry that 
are initially considered far apart. Hence, arguably, the field of imagination is particu-
larly poised for interdisciplinary enquiry. In the section on Imagination in 
Interdisciplinary Research, I will talk about some of the issues that have already 
entered that field of interdisciplinary inquiry.
This field becomes considerably larger if we also use the term ‘imagination’ for 
basic activities which go beyond the mere processing of perceptual data but are still 
considered integral to perception (e.g. because they occur in the absence of percep-
tual stimuli). In this respect, Hume’s and Kant’s accounts in particular are still 
reflected in contemporary research, albeit in ways which are not always explicit 
(Lohmar 1998). I will say something about this in the section on Imagination in 
Interdisciplinary Research too.
Before I turn to the matter of interdisciplinary research, however, I will first, in a 
section on Imagination in Phenomenology, sketch a general phenomenological position 
on imagination. I will mainly focus on Husserl’s account of phenomenology because it 
provides a solid reference point for understanding the context from which phenomeno-
logical contributions to interdisciplinary research on imagination are put forward.
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The bulk of Husserl’s investigations have only just been translated into English 
(Husserl 2005) and even in the German original they have only been available since 
the publication of Husserl’s lecture notes on “Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and 
Memory” in 1980 (Husserl 1980). This has meant that while many of Husserl’s obser-
vations on imagination had already been known – mostly via Sartre (2004)  and, in 
the analytic tradition, via Warnock (1976) and more recently McGinn (2004) – very 
few readers would have been aware of them as his. Thus it is also in order to rectify 
this situation somewhat that I will give considerable space to Husserl’s analyses.
Most phenomenological contributions to interdisciplinary research, however, are 
not made by interpreting specific phenomenological texts or authors (although they 
might be cited in support of particular claims) but by approaching issues in philoso-
phy of mind, psychology, cognitive science and the neurosciences from a generally 
speaking ‘phenomenological’ perspective. In this sense, current interdisciplinary 
work is arguable much closer to the original experimental spirit of phenomenology 
than any exegesis of textual sources can ever be.
Imagination in Phenomenology
In phenomenology, the concept of imagination has always played a prominent role. 
It was heralded by Husserl as the ‘vital element’ of phenomenology (Husserl 1983: 
160); appropriated by Heidegger as the ecstatic nature of Dasein2; identified by 
Sartre as “an essential and transcendental condition of consciousness” (Sartre 2004: 
188). It has been central to the work of philosophers as diverse as Bachelard 
(2005),3 Ricoeur (1977),4 Castoriadis (1994, 1998).5 Casey (1976) and others (most 
recently Marc Richir 2004).
Husserl describes imagining6 as an act of intuitively (i.e. quasi-perceptually), 
experiencing something in the mode of ‘inactuality’ or ‘irreality.’ He thus distin-
guishes imagining from a mere supposing or a ‘thinking of’ (which are intuitively 
‘empty’ acts), but also from remembering (which involves belief in the past reality 
of the remembered), from expecting (which involves belief in the future reality of 
the expected), and from perceiving (which involves belief in the present reality of 
the perceived). The essential differences between imagining and those other acts 
2 For an insightful account of Heidegger’s engagement with imagination see Elliot (2005).
3
 Bachelard combines an interest in the creative potential of imagination with an ethical and meta-
physical committment to imagination as a principle of freedom and transcendence (Kaplan 1972).
4
 Ricoeur’s hermeneutical phenomenology approaches imagination in its interconnection not with 
perception but with language.
5 Castoriadis explored the political power and effectiveness of a radical ‘imaginary.’
6 Husserl’s term is ‘phantasy’ (Phantasie) (Husserl 2005). In order to make this article more readible 
but also in order to preserve the connections to other discourses, I decided here to use the term 
‘imagination’ and its derivatives ‘imagining,’ ‘imagined’ etc. instead.
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are thus not differences amongst their contents (nor, as Hume had it, of their differ-
ing degrees of vivacity or intensity) but instead differences in the way (or ‘form’) 
in which they are experienced (Husserl 1984: 624). For example, whereas in per-
ception “the object appears to us, so to speak, ‘in person,’ as itself present,” in 
imagination the object appears as represented or possible; “it is as though it were 
there, but only as though.” (Husserl 2005: 18 (16)).
According to Husserl, imagination shares this ‘non-positing’ character, i.e. the 
lack of belief in the existence of its object, with what Husserl calls ‘picture-con-
sciousness.’7 This inclines us to think of imagination in analogy with picture-con-
sciousness, that is, with ‘seeing something in a picture’, hence in terms of ‘mental 
images’ that are analogous to pictures. However, as Husserl tries to show, imagin-
ing is in a crucial respect very unlike, even essentially different from, ‘seeing 
something in a picture.’8
When I look at a picture and see something ‘in it,’ the object I experience 
involves three distinct moments: (1) the physical picture, i.e., the canvas painted and 
framed, the patches of colour distributed on the canvas, etc., (2) the picture-object, 
i.e., the image which appears through a certain distribution of colours and shapes, 
and (3) the picture-subject, i.e., what is depicted or represented by the image.9 The 
crucial difference between imagination and picture-consciousness is, according to 
Husserl, that picture-consciousness requires the perception of an actual picture, 
while imagination does not.10
If our imagination playfully occupies itself with angels and devils, dwarfs and water nymphs 
(⋯), then the appearing objectivities are not taken as picture objects, as mere representatives, 
analogues, pictures of other objectivities (⋯). The word ‘imagination,’ the talk of ‘mental 
7
 Brough translates ‘Bildbewusstsein’ as ‘image consciousness’ (Husserl 2005). In order to make 
it more obvious that Husserl refers to pictures (and not to mental images) I will use ‘picture con-
sciousness’ instead.
8
 This is perhaps the most important difference between Husserl’s and Sartre’s accounts. See 
Stawarska (2005).  In this paper I can only allude to the aspects of picture-consciousness that are 
directly relevant to this distinction. For detailed discussions see Brough (1992, 2005), Marbach 
(1993), Volonté (1995), Lotz (2007).
9
 For example, when we look at a picture and say “this looks just like her!” we do not mean the 
physical picture (which looks like other physical pictures rather than like a real person), but we 
mean the picture object, i.e., the image that appears in the picture. On the other hand, the picture 
object clearly is not the depicted real ‘her’ who is probably of a different size and color, three-
dimensional, moving, etc. (Husserl 1980: 121f. (112)).
10
 It “seems most appropriate to speak of ‘pictoriality,’ of ‘pictorial apprehension’ only in cases in 
which a picture, which for its part first functions as a representing object for something depicted, 
actually appears. Hence in the case of simple imagination, in which this does not occur (however 
great the temptation to assume that the situation is the same), it is best to use a different term” 
(Husserl 2005: 94 (87)). – Initially, Husserl thinks of imagination in pictorial terms. My summary 
is based on Husserl’s mature account. For the considerable changes he made to his earlier position 
see Jansen (2005).
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images’ and so forth, ought not mislead us here any more than the talk of ‘perceptual images’ 
does in the case of perception (Husserl 2005: 92 (85); translation slightly modified).
Just as one does not, in perception, apprehend a perceptual representation as an 
image of the perceived object, one does not, in imagination, apprehend a ‘mental 
image’ that represents the imagined object. In perception as well as in imagination 
“the intention aims at the thing itself” (Husserl 2005: 192 (161)). Husserl thus 
identifies a parallelism between imagination and perception (not between imagina-
tion and picture-consciousness). Consequently, he vehemently rejects any ‘image-
theory’ of imagination that would use a “crude talk of internal images (as opposed 
to external objects)” (Husserl 1985: 437).
The parallelism between imagination and perception underscores the characteri-
sation of imagination as quasi-perception. Both intentional acts constitute an object 
and let it appear; they both have the same intentional structure and are subject to 
the same spatial and temporal articulation (imagining is an imagining in a quasi-
here-and-now) (Husserl 1973: 169ff.). In both acts I am also bodily present and 
thereby have a certain perspective on the intended object, which shows the same 
horizonal structures in both cases (Marbach 1993: 77).11 In short, imagination 
brings to bear the phenomenal aspects of its objects not by conjuring up mental 
images, which would represent those objects, but by simulating12 experiences of 
that object.
This simulation can be described phenomenologically in noetic as well in noe-
matic analysis.13 Noetic analysis shows how, in imagining, a type of experience is 
reproduced (perceiving visually, perceiving haptically, seeing something in a pic-
ture, etc.) while, noematic analysis shows how, at the same time, an object is made 
present, or represented (Husserl 1969: 128). Strictly speaking, then, in Husserl’s 
view, imagining requires the reproduction of an experience. Or rather, it requires 
the implication of a possible experience: a simulation.14
Imagining is thus essentially different from supposing, which, by contrast, does 
not imply the simulation of any experiences of the thus supposed objects or states 
of affairs. It is because we are, in imagination, aware of simulating the experience 
as well as the object that we notice a “peculiar mediacy” (Husserl 1959: 116), not 
because a doubling up of objects occurs (mental image plus imagined object).
Of course, while I’m imagining something, I also actually experience something. 
For example, while I am imagining (making present) a beautiful beach and imagin-
ing (simulating) possible ways of experiencing it, namely visually (seeing the white 
11 This holds for all sensory modes: visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, gustatory.
12
 Husserl does not use the term ‘simulation’ but speaks instead of ‘quasi-experience’.
13 Noetic analyses describe the experience of imagining; noematic analyses describe the imagined 
object.
14
 Husserl’s use of the notion of implication (instead of the now common ‘simulation’) only high-
lights the fact that the ‘reproduced’ act is not actually performed, the ‘reproduced’ experience not 
actually experienced, but only ‘implied’ as a possible experience of the imagined object (Marbach: 
1993: 61f).
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sand, the blue water, etc.), haptically (feeling the sand running through my fingers), 
etc., I still, unfortunately, perceive my actual surroundings (the desk I’m sitting at, 
the rain I can hear lashing on the windows), and I am also actually experiencing my 
imagining being on the beach. When I lose this anchoring in the actual situation I 
am not imagining but hallucinating or dreaming (Marbach 1993: 83–85).
Furthermore, the phenomenological distinction between noesis and noema 
enables an account of the self-ascription of imaginings. That I experience my imag-
inings as my imaginings, as belonging to the one I who is now also perceiving, is 
anything but trivial since the imaginary world is neither subject to ‘the legislation 
of reason’, nor constrained by actual space or time (Husserl 2005: 214f. (178)). 
Noematically, in other words, that which I imagine is entirely independent from the 
constraints of my actual world of experience. There is no necessary noematic link 
between what we perceive and what we imagine. Noetically, however, our imagin-
ings, perceptions, memories and so forth are united in our one consciousness by our 
living through them, or experiencing them (Husserl 1975: 175f).
In summary, according to Husserl, imagining lacks belief and reality (it is ‘non-
positing’, ‘inactual’ or ‘irreal’) and is in this sense a ‘neutralized’ representation.15 
It involves a quasi-performance or simulation of experiences, such as perceiving, 
judging, feeling, etc. (Husserl 2005: texts 15, 18a). These experiences are, Husserl 
observes, implied as possible experiences of the imagined objects. As he repeatedly 
emphasizes, however, we are not aware of the simulation of such possible experi-
ences as mental representations, but we enact them in our experiences of imagined 
objects. Any experience can be thus simulated I may imagine myself perceiving, 
judging, thinking, feeling something and so forth, that is, the imaginative modifica-
tion is universal.16
Husserl advances his theory of imagination not only against contemporary ver-
sions of ‘image theory’ but also against the Kantian notion of a transcendental 
imagination. Unlike Heidegger, Husserl condemns the ‘transcendental imagination’ 
as an unnecessary by-product of Kant’s faculty psychology. Especially in his early 
works, he straightforwardly dismisses Kant’s notion as ‘untenable’ on the grounds 
that it lacks phenomenological evidence. However, Husserl revises his judgment 
when he begins his work on ‘genetic constitution,’ i.e., on constitutive syntheses 
which Husserl identifies as tacitly effective in perceptual experience. By the time 
Husserl is working on his Paris lectures (later published in the Crisis) he speaks of 
Kant’s “great discovery” of the “twofold operation of the understanding.” Husserl 
15 Similarly Sartre distinguishes between the positing of perception, which posits its object as existing, 
and the positing of imagination, which posits its object as nonexistent, absent, existing elsewhere 
or neutralised (Sartre 2004: 12).
16
 Given that Husserl describes imagining as involving the suspension of belief, it remains unclear 
whether it is possible to simulate the experience of believing. See the section on ‘imagination and 
belief’ below for a brief discussion of this issue.
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thus extends the meaning of understanding (or rationality) so that it comprises both 
operations: the personal, explicit, or ‘active’ syntheses of cognition and judgment; 
and the sub-personal, tacit, or ‘passive’ syntheses that configure meaning in the 
intuitively given life-world (Husserl 1970:103 f.).
Hence Kant’s distinction between intellect and transcendental imagination is 
transformed by Husserl into the distinction between ‘active synthesis’ and ‘passive 
syntheses.’ Importantly, however, for Husserl, passive syntheses are not regulated by 
concepts, let alone a priori ones (as is Kant’s transcendental synthesis of imagina-
tion). On the contrary, meaning is generated ‘bottom up’, so to speak, through the 
passive syntheses, which are sub-personal perceptual, pre-predicative, pre-reflective 
and pre-linguistic (Steinbock 2001: xli; Husserl 2001). Thus, Husserl addresses the 
issue raised by Kant’s notion of transcendental imagination but does so by integrating 
its functions into the complex system of perception itself and thus by making them 
constitutive of the very understanding that Kant thought was in control of them.
Thinking of phenomenological descriptions in relation to the Kantian notion of 
transcendental imagination highlights important aspects of a generally speaking phe-
nomenological account of imagination17: Although it is discovered in reflection that per-
ception indeed always already exceeds the mere processing of sense data, this is 
typically not considered evidence for any ‘imaginative’ activity. On the contrary, it is 
generally held amongst phenomenologists that perception itself, even in its most ele-
mentary moments, “arouses the expectation of more than it contains, and … is therefore 
already charged with a meaning” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 4). In perception, as Sartre 
said, “I always perceive more and otherwise than I see” (Sartre 2004:120). Imagination 
and perception are therefore considered distinct; “far from being two elementary psy-
chic factors of similar quality and that simply enter into different combinations (they) 
represent the two great irreducible attitudes of consciousness” (Sartre 2004: 120). He 
passive or prereflective syntheses which phenomenologists identify as constitutive 
of experience are hence not, as is Kauf’s transcendental synthesis of imagination, 
understood in terms of a ‘top down’ process of experience. Rather, phenomenolo-
gists attempt to describe the complex ways in which our concepts are grounded in 
perception and arise through processes of abstraction and formalisation in a “genesis 
of meaning” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: xix; Husserl 2001; Husserl 1970).
Imagination in Interdisciplinary Research
There has been a relatively recent resurgence of and a more concerted interest in 
imagination in analytic philosophy of mind. In a climate in which imagination was 
often considered an expression of old-fashioned idealism or of a misguided pre-
occupation of continental philosophy, Mary Warnock (1976) took an important step 
towards rehabilitating it as a serious object of philosophical analysis. Kendall 
17 These two aspects are only meant as typical, not as necessary, features of a phenomenologica 
approach. My rendering is mainly based on Husserl’s, Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s writings.
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Walton’s later proposal to comprehend children’s play, fiction and other artistic 
productions as different forms of regulated imaginary pretence (Walton 1990) has 
been immensely influential in debates on pretence, fiction, and emotional responses 
to fiction; but it also established imagination as an indispensable element of such 
debates (Currie 1990, 1995, 1997; Meskin and Weinberg 2003). More recently, 
imagination has entered into wider epistemological and ethical investigations 
regarding counterfactuals, conceivability, belief and supposition, action theory, 
‘mind reading,’ and creativity (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; Gendler and 
Hawthorne 2003; Gendler 2003; Byrne 2004; Nichols 2006; Nettle 2001). This 
work has begun to cross over into psychology and psychopathology, especially with 
respect to the role of imagination in autism and schizophrenia, which are both con-
sidered ‘pathologies of the imagination’ (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; Phillips and 
Morley 2003). Since phenomenologists, such as Gallagher (2005, 2004), Zahavi 
(2004, with Parnas 2003, 2001), Casey (2003), Fuchs (2005), Ratcliffe (2006), 
2008), are engaging in the very same debates, interdisciplinary imagination 
research has also brought opportunities for intra-disciplinary discussion.
Until very recently, it seemed inconceivable that the cognitive sciences would (or 
could) ever pursue the explanation of something as elusive and capricious, but also as 
subjective and ‘mentalistic’ as imagination. During the long-lasting reign of behav-
iourism,18 imagination seemed pushed, once and for all, into “the outer darkness of 
intellectual irrelevance” (Morley 2005: 117). However, the so-called ‘cognitive turn,’ 
which turned psychology on its head in the 1970s, triggered new interest in imagina-
tion and thus brought relief from the ‘iconophobia’ (Thomas 2007) of the earlier days. 
Current research on imagination, its neurological manifestations and its psychological 
(normal as well as pathological) effects is flourishing (Chalmers and Bourget 2007).
In what follows I will briefly outline some of those aspects of imagination 
research that either have already been taken up in interdisciplinary debate or obvi-
ously lend themselves to it. These are: (a) mental imagery; (b) ‘mind reading’; (c) 
imagination and belief; (d) imagination as ‘ingredient of perception’; and (e) imagi-
nation and aesthetics. Since the issue of mental imagery is, in ways that will 
become clear below, fundamental to phenomenological views on other matters, 
I will discuss it in more detail than the others.
In what follows, I will address each issue in turn. Where phenomenological 
approaches have not been advanced (or where I am not aware of them), I will try to 
outline possible avenues for such contributions.
(a) Mental Imagery. Does imagination or mental imagery imply the existence of 
mental images? In contemporary research, this question forms the contentious 
basis of what’s known as the ‘imagery debate’ (Block 1981; Tye 1991). Three 
principal answers have been given to this question:
(1) Yes. Mental imagery involves representations that are ‘image like.’ In line 
with a long philosophical tradition, Hannay (1971, 1973), Kosslyn (1980, 
18
 “I believe we can write a psychology (…) and (…) never use the terms consciousness, mental 
states, mind, content, introspectively verifiable, imagery, and the like” (Watson 1913).
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1994), Tye (1988, 1991), Cohen (1996) defend pictorial accounts of mental 
imagery on the grounds of psychological and neurological experiments 
involving, for example, ‘mental rotation’ (Shepard with Cooper 1982, with 
Metzler 1971) and ‘mental scanning’ (Kosslyn 1978) tasks. Differences in 
the speed and ease with which subjects were able to rotate and scan imagined 
objects have been found to correlate with the spatial relations of the imagined 
objects. For example, subjects were able to shift attention from one point to 
another point on an imagined map faster if the two points were closer 
together on the corresponding actual map. This has been taken to suggest that 
mental imagery involves certain spatial features which correspond to, or 
‘function like’ the spatial features of the object represented. Recent neuro-
logical research suggests that imagining activates corresponding perceptual 
visual and motor areas has been taken to lend new support for this thesis 
(Farah 1988, 1989; Kosslyn et al. 1993) although there also is evidence that 
this is not always the case (Bértolo 2005).
(2) No. Mental Imagery involves representations that are not imagistic or picto-
rial but descriptional. Objections against the pictorial model include the claim 
that mental imagery is too indeterminate to represent pictorially (or even 
‘quasi-pictorially’) (Fodor 1975) and the contention that imagery is more like 
a description than like an image (Dennett 1969; Pylyshyn 1973, 1981). 
Connected to this position are at least two more general positions: one, that 
any image theory inevitably leads into the homunculus fallacy; two, that men-
tal imagery is not self-contained but that it depends on background knowledge 
and tacit conceptual processes (cognitive penetrability). Pylyshyn puts it like 
this: “there is much more to what your mental image does and what it ‘looks 
like’ than meets the eye – even the ‘mind’s eye’” (Pylyshyn 2003a: 6.1). As a 
result of this view, the distinction between ‘imagining’ and ‘imagining that’ 
disappears, at least on the sub-personal level. It might remain as a phenome-
nal difference but, according to descriptionalists, this might be more pro-
nounced in experimental conditions in which ‘implied task demands’ direct 
the imagining excercises in particular ways. The same objections that were 
raised against the earlier psychological version also have been directed at its 
neurological heir. Moreover, as Pylyshyn points out, the explanatory value of 
recent formulations of pictorialism in which mental images are said to be only 
‘functionally’ pictorial and ‘digitized’ is questionable (Pylyshyn 2003b).
One of the main objections against the descriptional view is that it fails to account 
for neurological evidence indicating that neural visual and motor processes active in 
imagery largely overlap with those active in perception. However, it has been empha-
sized that this does not necessarily support the pictorial view (Bartolomeo 2002).
(3) No, because we have no evidence for the existence of any mental representa-
tions, pictorial or descriptional. While the ‘imagery debate’ continues, there is 
a growing body of alternative accounts of perception as enactive, embodied and 
situated that is supported by neurological evidence (Varela et al. 1991; Hurley 
1998; Gallagher 2005; Noë 2004; Noë and O’Regan 2001; Clark 1997). This 
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has had important implications for conceptions of imagination (Hurley 2006; 
Jeannerod, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2001; Bartolomeo 2002). In line with Husserl’s 
original observations, these accounts corroborate the view that although we 
have plenty of phenomenological evidence for imagining and mental imagery 
we have no phenomenological evidence for the existence of mental representa-
tions. When we imagine something we experience, in an imaginative way, what 
we imagine, not an ‘image’ of it; just as when we perceive something we experi-
ence, in a perceptual way, what we perceive, not an ‘image’ of it.19
Sartre (2004), Wittgenstein (2001), and Ryle (2002) are usually credited for hav-
ing advanced some of the strongest and earliest challenges to any such theory of 
mental representation.20 In recent years, McGinn (2004), who largely draws on 
Sartre’s writings, has re-asserted a, broadly speaking, phenomenological critique of 
representationalism. The principle objection against what Sartre calls the ‘illusion 
of immanence’ of image theory, the equivalent to Dennett’s ‘Cartesian theatre’ 
(Sartre 2004; Dennett 1991), is succinctly put by Slezak: what “these doctrines 
have in common is the mistake of assuming that we apprehend our mental states 
rather than just have them” (Slezak 2002).
In conjunction with the situated and embodied aspects of enactive accounts of per-
ception, this view has led to a theory of imagination as enacted and embodied simula-
tion (Thompson 2007b; Thomas 2007; Currie and Ravenscroft 2002).21 Imagination is 
thus no longer understood as “an experience in which we seem to see or have a mental 
picture” but rather as “the activity of mentally representing an object or a scene by way 
of mentally enacting or entertaining a possible perceptual experience of that object or 
scene” (Thompson 2007a: 143). As a result, researchers now speak not only of sensory 
imagination (visual, audio, olfactory, gustatory, haptic) but also of motor imagination, 
i.e., imagination of action (Jeannerod 1994, 1995, 1997, 2001).22
(b) Mindreading. We often use the metaphor of ‘reading someone’s mind’ when we 
describe how we figure out what another person believes or feels. Our capacity 
to make sense of others and their behaviour is generally considered “a prerequisite 
for normal social interaction” (Frith and Happé 1999:2; Harris 2000). In current 
20
 Not only Sartre but also Ryle and Wittgenstein were familiar with Husserl’s work, at least to 
some extent.
19 Note in this context that Pylyshyn’s description of the three levels involved in the explanation of 
mental imagery corresponds closely with the three moment of picture-consciousness outlined by 
Husserl: “At the first level we can ask about the content, or what the representation represents – 
what it is about. (…) At the second level of analysis, we can inquire about the form of the repre-
sentation, the system of codes by which mental objects can represent aspects of the world. (…) 
The third level of analysis of mental representations is concerned with how representations are 
realized in biological tissue or implemented in hardware” (Pylyshyn 2003a).
21
 This idea of enacted and embodied simulation, which we also find in Husserl (see above), is not 
to be confused with the notion of simulation employed in so-called ‘simulation theory,’ which is 
thought of as a mental representation rather than an embodied enactment (see below).
22
 The issue of visual imagination dominates debates; investigations of other modes are rare. See, 
for example, Reisberg (1992).
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research the term comprises investigations into our abilities to ‘read’ other minds 
as our own (Nichols and Stich 2003).
Recent neuroscientific studies with persons suffering from Autism Spectrum 
Disorders and schizophrenia have rekindled psychological and philosophical inter-
est. Discussions are currently dominated by two prominent competing theories 
about the abilities and processes involved in ‘mind reading’: ‘theory theory’ 
(Baron-Cohen 1989, 1995; Leslie 1991; Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997; Carruthers and 
Smith 1996) and ‘simulation theory’ (Goldmann 1989; Gordon 1986, 1995; Heal 
1986, 1998a, b). Generally speaking, ‘theory theory’ assumes that we take a (folk-) 
theoretical stance by means of which we infer what the other believes or feels, 
while ‘simulation theory assumes that we simulate what we would experience if we 
were in the other’s situation. In short, ‘theory theory’ says we think about other 
people’s mental states while ‘simulation theory’ tells us that we imagine them 
(Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; Zahavi and Parnas 2003). Simulation seemed to 
receive additional support from neurological evidence, when Giacomo Rizzolatti, 
with Vittorio Gallese and other members of their research team discovered the 
activity of mirror neurons23 (Fogassi et al. 1998; Gallese and Goldmann 1998).
In opposition to the representationalist approach of both ‘theory theory’ and ‘simula-
tion theory’ and in line with enactive and phenomenological views on perception, 
Gallagher defends the claim that “in most intersubjective situations we have a direct 
understanding of another person’s intentions because their intentions are explicitly 
expressed in their embodied actions, and mirrored in our own capabilities for action” 
(Gallagher 2005: 224). This view does not exclude that in some situations, in which we 
find it perhaps more difficult to make sense of someone, we do use either a theoretical 
stance or empathetic imagination. As Zahavi and Parnas have pointed out: “the crucial 
question is not whether we can predict and explain the behaviour of others, and if so, 
how that happens, but rather whether such prediction and explanation constitute the 
primary and most fundamental form of intersubjectivity” (Zahavi and Parnas 2003).
Especially, if we think of imagination as enacted and embodied simulation (see 
above) and not as the possession of a mental state; and if we think of the theoretical 
stance as an assessment of behaviour and not of mental states; this does not imply the 
representationalist model criticised by phenomenologists (Gallagher, 2005; Zahavi 
2004). It also does not contradict neurological findings, which precisely demonstrate 
an embodied enactment, not the presence of a mental presentation (Gallagher 2005; 
Hurley 2006; Lohmar 2006, 2008). In this way then, we can integrate evidence that 
autism at least often includes imaginative disorders (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002) 
into a more general phenomenological account of autism. For example, one could 
investigate the ways in which difficulties in imaginatively transposing oneself into a 
different situation or perspective are related to an impaired imaginary of the self 
which can accompany more basic forms of self-awareness just as self-knowledge can 
(Zahavi and Parnas 2003: 67; Raffman, 1999). This might also make phenomenological 
23
 Mirror neurons are neurons in the pre-motor cortex that display the same patterns of activity 
when an action is observed as they display when an action is performed. In that sense, they are 
said to ‘mirror’ in the observer the neurological activity present in the performer of the action.
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approaches to empathy (Stein 1989) relevant for contemporary research in social 
neuroscience (Decety and Grèzes 2006; Decety and Hodges 2006).
In a similar way, current phenomenological contributions to interdisciplinary 
research on schizophrenia (Danion and Huron 2007; Gallagher 2004; Parnas 2004, 
with Handest 2003, with Parnas and Sass 2002; Parnas and Sass 2006; Depraz 2003; 
Zahavi 2001) can be augmented by an exploration of the ‘imaginative disorders’ 
involved both in schizophrenic delusion as well as schizophrenic hallucination 
(Casey 2003). All these enquiries demand careful attention to the ways in which our 
awareness of self, of others and of objects is enacted and embodied (Fuchs 2005).
(c) Imagination and Belief. Investigations into the relation between imagination and 
belief obviously arise from a notion of imagination as ‘make believe’ or pre-
tence. These debates are gathering additional momentum from psychological 
and neuroscientific research into developmental and pathological issues of pre-
tence, for example in autistic children (Harris 2000; Hurley with Chater 2005; 
Frith and Happé 1999; Currie and Ravenscroft 2002).
However, there is also a perhaps more fundamental question about differences 
between imagining something (without believing it) and supposing it (without believ-
ing it). This question becomes more complex again considering the view that one can 
imagine beliefs, just as one can imagine experiences and desires, and that supposing 
something is imagining a belief (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002). Phenomenological 
analysis, however, casts doubt on such a conception. We do not have to simulate the 
experience of believing in a state of affairs in order to suppose that state of affairs. 
In fact, a ‘mere’ supposition is precisely characterized by a lack of belief. Rather, in 
supposing something, or in ‘imagining that …’ we consider a state of affairs possible, 
while suspending the question of whether we believe in it or not. Neither the noetic 
aspect of imagining (the simulation of an experience) nor the noematic aspect of 
imagining (the simulation of the object) need be present in supposing.
Further, it is questionable whether we can simulate belief. Belief is a mode in 
which we intend something, e.g., we can entertain a thought in the mode of belief, 
or doubt, or under the suspension of belief-we can perceive with belief (as we usu-
ally do), but we can also doubt what we perceive (when, for example, we are aware 
of a perceptual illusion). To talk about ‘belief-like imagining’ hence implies that we 
can simulate that particular mode of experiencing something with belief. It is 
unclear whether it is possible to do that but it seems pretty clear that this is not what 
we do in supposing or when we ‘imagine that …’ Thus it seems that if, in line with 
ordinary language, we still want to refer to such acts as instances of imagining, then 
at least we have to note this essential difference between them (O’Brien 2005).
The fact that in experience cases of mere supposing and imagining are not 
always clearly distinguishable is a good reason for considering those issues as 
related. Recent work on counterfactual thinking, which includes both activities, has 
shown the great extent to which many rational operations depend on them (Byrne 
2004). Moreover, research on ‘imaginative contagion’ has shown that either can 
have great impacts on our (actual) beliefs (Gendler 2007).
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(d) Imagination as ‘Ingredient of Perception.’ Hume’s and Kant’s idea that imagination 
has a necessary (Hume) or transcendental (Kant) function in perception is still 
part of contemporary discourse, whether imagination is (Johnson 1987, with 
Lakoff 1999) or is not (Prinz 2002, McDowell 1994) explicitly referred to. 
The underlying idea is that we do not just ‘see’ what there is but that we also import 
or project certain elements into perception. In other words, there is evidence of 
a gap between present perceptual stimuli and what is perceptually experienced 
as present. Recent research on ‘change blindness’ (the failure to perceive even 
great changes in a perceived scene), ‘inattentional blindness’ (the failure to perceive 
events outside one’s attentional focus), and ‘filling-in’ or ‘perceptual completion’ 
(the seeing of a figure as complete although parts of it are outside the visual 
field) has stirred a debate on the so-called ‘grand illusion’ of perception (Noë 
2002a). Contributions to this debate from the ‘enactive’ and ‘embodied’ perspective 
make use of the phenomenological evidence already invoked by Husserl, 
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre to highlight the differences between perception and 
imagination and thus to reject the hypothesis of a ‘grand illusion’ (Noë 2002b; 
Thompson et al. 1999). However, paying special attention to the differences – 
within perception – between those elements that can be explained with reference 
to present stimuli and those that cannot surely amounts to important research 
into the nature of perception and does not require representationalism (O’Connor 
and Aardema 2005; Lohmar 2008; Lennon 2009 forthcoming).
(e) Imagination and Aesthetics. I mentioned above the strong interest in ‘make 
believe’, fiction and emotions manifest in recent discussion in aesthetics. 
Traditionally, imagination has played a great role in conceptions of aesthetic 
experience as well. However, while cognitive and neuro-scientists have turned 
towards aesthetic experience and, in particular, to our experience of beauty 
(Kawabata and Zeki 2004; Zeki 1999a,b, 2002; Romano 2002; Blood and Zatorre 
2001; Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999; Solso 1996), there has been little phe-
nomenological response to the emerging discipline of neuroesthetics.24 Perhaps 
aesthetic experience is considered too complex and too phenomenologically 
under-researched for focused interdisciplinary debate. And there are reasons to 
be sceptical about initial interpretations of neurological findings (Seeley 2006; 
Jansen 2006; Ione 2003). However, this only calls for more phenomenological 
clarification of aesthetic experience and its imaginative dimension, which in 
recent years has perhaps not received as much attention as it should.
24 Lead by Semir Zeki, researchers at University College London and University of California at 
Berkeley founded the Institute of Neuroesthetics in 2002. For further information, see http://www.
neuroesthetics.org/index.html.
153Phenomenology, Imagination and Interdisciplinary Research
Conclusion
Whereas each of these issues constitutes an individual research area that has largely 
been pursued independently from all the others, it is also possible to regard these 
areas as moments of an emerging integrated field of inquiry profiting – by means 
of processes of mutual constraint and instruction (Gallagher 1997) – from cross-
fertilization across disparate disciplines, such as philosophy, cognitive science, 
neuroscience, psychology, psychopathology and psychiatry. This perspective keeps 
open a space in which further research will show whether and how the many dif-
ferent senses of imagination can be related phenomenologically, conceptually, 
psychologically, or neurologically. This, I take it, is the best reason to approach 
imagination in phenomenology and interdisciplinary research with a ‘holistic 
stance’ and – if only now and again, when one looks up from one’s own specialized 
work – consider it as a multifaceted but integrated field of research.
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